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NOTES
motivation to prove a violation does not exist when an employer has
committed himself to violating, through a supervisor, the protected
rights of the employees. By giving the instructions, the employer
not only has manifested an intention, but also has done all that he
possibly can to bring about the violation. The success of the effort
depends on whether or not the supervisor obeys the employer's
orders. Despite this, the effective interference standard, as
employed in Belcher Towing and the line of cases before it,
disregards the important fact that the employer's manifested inten-
tion is at the same time an act that tends to violate the protected
rights of employees. And the tendency to violate employee rights
has long been sufficient to constitute an 8(a)(1) violation. 9
The Belcher Towing standard is problematical. It does nothing
other than provide the employer an opportunity to avoid violating
the Act by refraining from dismissing the supervisor who refuses to
obey his instructions. For the employer who is willing to risk Board
charges if a supervisor does follow instructions to commit an unfair
labor practice, the Belcher Towing standard provides something like
an incentive. The employer knows that if his supervisor refuses to
follow the instructions, the employer can avoid unfair labor practice
violations by keeping the supervisor on the payroll. At the same
time, Cannon Electric and its theory of attempted interference re-
mains operative. A blanket application of Cannon Electric not only
would remove employer incentive to coerce employees through the
actions of a supervisor, but also would remove employer opportunity
for self-absolution. In the area of labor law, absolution remains in
the exclusive province of the Board.
David Michael Hunter
League of Women Voters v. The City of New Orleans:
STANDING OR POLITICAL QUESTION?
The League of Women Voters of New Orleans, a nonprofit organi-
zation, and two New Orleans taxpayers sued for a writ of manda-
79. In 1948, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals said that the test for determining
an 8(a)(1) violation is whether "the employer engaged in conduct which, it may
reasonably be said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights under
the Act." NLRB v. Ford, 170 F.2d 735, 738 (6th Cir. 1948). This proposition was
reiterated by the seventh cicuit eleven years later: "No proof of coercive intent or
effect is necessary under section 8(a)(1) of the Act, the test being 'whether the
employer engaged in conduct which, it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere with
the free exercise of employee rights under the Act.'" Time-O-Matic, Inc. v. NLRB, 264
F.2d 96, 99 (7th Cir. 1959).
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mus' to compel various local and state agencies and officials' to cor-
rect the millage adjustments for 1978. Plaintiffs sued to compel cor-
rection of the millage adjustments because they believed that such
correction was directed by Act 617 of 1977, as amended by Act 614
of 1978.1 The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to sue in their capacity as taxpayers of the City of
New Orleans. The court stated that the plaintiffs' general allega-
tions, that as a result of reduced revenues they would suffer a loss
of vital services, were not peculiar to the plaintiffs themselves or
even to taxpayers as a class, but were common to the public at
large. League of Women Voters of New Orleans v. The City of New
Orleans, 381 So. 2d 441 (La. 1980).
In the 1968 decision of Flast v. Cohen,' Chief Justice Warren
described the concept of justiciability as encompassing two parallel
1. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3861-63. Whether a writ of mandamus could have issued
to require the agencies and officials to perform their duties was an issue never reach-
ed by the court. Yet, the Act requires that adjustment errors be corrected, and it
provides mechanisms for such correction by directing the City Council to recompute
and the legislative auditor to order changes necessary to correct any error or errors.
Thus, it seems, a writ of mandamus was the proper remedy.
2. The local and state agencies and officials were the City of New Orleans and its
Mayor, the City Council, the members of the City Council individually, the Board of
Levee Commissioners of the Parish of Orleans, the Board of Assessors of Orleans
Parish, and the assessors who comprise the Board. League of Women Voters v. The
City of New Orleans, 381 So. 2d 441 (La. 1980).
3. Article VII, section 23 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution provided for a
new system of property appraisal in Louisiana. As a result of this new system, each
tax recipient body was to adjust its millage for 1978 so that it would provide for the
same revenue as was collected in the preceeding year. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 23.
The Act required the assessors of each parish to furnish the parish taxing
authorities with a correct statement of the assessed value of taxable property on the
tax rolls in 1977. 1977 La. Acts, No. 617, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 614. The
assessors submitted erroneous figures to the City Council and the Levee Board, and as
a result of this erroneous information the 1978 millage was incorrectly fixed. League of
Women Voters of New Orleans v. The City of New Orleans, 381 So. 2d 441, 444 (La.
1980).
Section five of the Act further requires the City Council and the Levee Board to
recompute and determine the millage that should have been levied on the 1978 tax
rolls and to use the recomputation to impose an adjustment for 1979 solely to recoup
revenue losses for 1978. This process is designed to correct any errors that may have
occurred. The City Council did meet in order to recompute, as required by section five,
and did pass an ordinance to that effect; however, the Council did not impose the
adjustment. 381 So. 2d at 444.
Finally, section seven of the Act authorizes and requires the legislative auditor to
review the millages of each tax recipient body to determine whether or not they are in
compliance with the Act and the constitution. Furthermore, the legislative auditor shall
order changes in the amount of millages levied if he determines that an error or errors
have been made in the adjustment of the millages.




yet distinct requirements. The first necessitates the presence of
genuine and actual legal issues presented by truly adverse parties
and in a form capable of resolution by the judicial process.5 The
second limitation recognizes that the concept of justiciability defines
the distinct role assigned to the judiciary in order to maintain the
integrity of a tripartite allocation of power. Arising from the doc-
trine of separation of powers, this limitation assures that courts will
not intrude into spheres of authority committed to other branches of
government or to the populace.' The latter is commonly referred to
as the political question doctrine.
One device used by Louisiana courts to ensure that a case is appro-
priate for judicial resolution is standing,' a limitation which requires
the existence of specifically ascertainable interests in the litigating
parties. The standing requirement is reflected in Code of Civil Proce-
dure article 681's mandate that the party plaintiff have a real and
actual interest in the matter The interest requirement in the party
plaintiff promotes the zealous investigation of law and fact and
ensures a fair presentation and development of the issues by truly
adverse parties.!
In Louisiana Independent Auto Dealers Association v. State,"
the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that "[tihe degree of adversity
required to present the issues will vary from case to case, depend-
ing upon the issue presented."" The court further recognized that
"[flacile rules of thumb are not . . . very helpful in the borderline
5. See Lousiana Independent Auto Dealers Ass'n v. State, 295 So. 2d 796, 801
(La. 1974); Petition of Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans, 248 La. 169, 175,
177 So. 2d 276, 278 (1965); State v. Board of Supervisors, 228 La. 951, 955, 84 So. 2d
597, 600 (1955). See also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-42 (1937);
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 263-64 (1933); Abbott v. Parker,
259 La. 279, 307, 249 So. 2d 908, 918 (1971) (the Louisiana Supreme Court defined
"justiciable controversy" in a similar manner).
6. See U.S. CONST. arts. I, II & III; LA. CONST. art. II, §§ 1 & 2. See also Com-
mercial Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51 (1923); First Municipality v.
Pease, 2 La. Ann. 538 (1847).
7. See Guidry v. Roberts, 331 So. 2d 44, 47 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976). See also
Hainkel v. Henry, 313 So. 2d 577, 579 (La. 1975); Abbott v. Parker, 259 La. 279, 249 So.
2d 908, 918 (1971).
8. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 681 provides: "Except as otherwise provided by law, an
action can be brought only by a person having a real and actual interest which he
asserts."
9. See Louisiana Independent Auto Dealers Ass'n v. State, 295 So. 2d 796, 799
(La. 1974). "Courts of justice are to decide real contests; they are never to be used as
instruments to work injustice, wound the feeling or affect the interests of others,
through the intervention of fictitious or uninterested parties." Livingston v.
D'Orgenoy, 1 Mart. (O.S.) 87, 95 (La. 1810).
10. 295 So. 2d 796, 801 (La. 1974).
11. Id. at 801.
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action-in determining whether the minimum elements of 'interest'
and 'adversity' are present."'"
The interest asserted by the taxpayer plaintiffs in League of
Women Voters was that the failure to adjust millage rates and the
concomitant loss of revenues to the Levee Board and the City of
New Orleans would "cause imminent and irreparable harm by jeo-
pardizing petitioners Turner and Wisdom's individual interest in
receiving sufficient police, fire and flood protection, and other essen-
tial services."'" The supreme court rejected the plaintiffs' general
allegations of jeopardy to their interests in receiving vital services,
noting that such interests were "not peculiar to plaintiffs them-
selves or even to taxpayers as a class, but are common to the public
at large."'" The court based its decision upon Schoeffner v. Dowling5
and other Louisiana decisions 6 requiring that the plaintiff express a
"special and peculiar interest" when seeking to compel performance
of a duty owed to the public at large."7
The court felt compelled to distinguish the first circuit opinion
of Bussie v. Long,8 wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court refused
writs. "Unlike the taxpayers in Bussie," observed the court, "plain-
tiffs here do not seek to restrain an increase in the burden of taxa-
tion. Instead they seek to compel an increase."'" This distinction is
perhaps inaccurate. The plaintiffs in Bussie sued to compel the Tax
12. Id., quoting J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 57.15 (1973).
13. 381 So. 2d at 446. The League of Women Voters characterized their interest:
"The noncollection of these funds will also thwart two basic goals of the petitioner
League, which are, to find increased sources of revenue for City government and to
ensure the equitable distribution of taxes based upon principles of ability to pay and
benefits received." Id.
14. Id. at 447.
15. 158 La. 706, 104 So. 624 (1925).
16. Marshall v. Town of Marksville, 116 La. 746, 41 So. 57 (1906) (taxpayers sued
the town to set aside an election which resulted in favor of issuing licenses for the sale
of liquor); Jumonville v. Hebert, 170 So. 497 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936) (taxpayer sued to
compel an officer to enforce certain gambling laws). See Black v. New Orleans Ry. &
Light Co., 145 La. 180, 82 So. 81 (1919) (suit by New Orleans taxpayers against the
City and street railway company to enjoin the collection of a car fare increase-5c to
60); City of Alexandria v. Policy Jury of Rapides Parish, 139 La. 635, 71 So. 928 (1916)
(appeal by taxpayers from a judgment annulling an election voting for prohibition in
the parish); Akin v. Caddo Parish Policy Jury, 234 So. 2d 203 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970)
(twenty-nine taxpayers sued to enjoin Caddo Parish Policy Jury from expanding and
enlarging the parish courthouse and to prohibit the removal of any live oaks surround-
ing the courthouse).
17. 381 So. 2d at 447.
18. 286 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 288 So. 2d 354 (La. 1974).
The Louisiana Supreme Court in denying writs stated that there was no error as to
the court of appeal's judgment of law.
19. 381 So. 2d at 447.
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Commission to implement an equalization of statewide property ad
valorem assessments pursuant to Louisiana Constitution article X,
sections one through twelve, and Louisiana Revised Statutes
47:1951-2000.' There is no indication in the Bussie opinion that
equalization of property assessments would result in a decrease in
the plaintiffs' tax burden. On the contrary, the opposite result seems
likely.' One contemporary writer noted that "generally speaking,
new homes were placed on the tax rolls at between 5% and 300/o of
their fair market value"' as opposed to all properties being assessed
at their actual cash value. Little distinction can be drawn between
Bussie and League of Women Voters. Both cases involve plaintiffs
suing as taxpayers to compel public officers to comply with legisla-
tive mandates, and in both cases compliance could possibly increase
the plaintiffs' tax burden.
Dissenting in League of Women Voters, Justice Dixon observed
that "Itihe 'special and peculiar' interest of plaintiffs in Bussie ...
was no more 'special and peculiar' than that of plaintiffs in this
case."'" Similarly, Justice Dennis expressed concern that, in light of
recent jurisprudence" and the absence of a statute restricting tax-
payers' access to the courts, the rule adopted by the majority was
unduly restrictive." Consequently the taxpayer-plaintiffs in League
of Women Voters appear to have demonstrated a sufficient interest
to assure adversity. Their alleged loss (in city revenues and vital
services) positioned them opposite the City of New Orleans and the
Board of Assessors, both of whom were being asked to comply with
the legislative tax scheme. Although more difficult to individualize
than overtaxation (which creates a more readily identifiable burden
upon each taxpayer), the plaintiff's interest is nonetheless sufficient
to satisfy the traditional purpose of the standing requirement, ie.,
the parties were sufficiently adverse to ensure an adequate develop-
ment of the issues and of the law and facts presented."
20. 286 So. 2d at 696.
21. Id. at 704.
22. Conroy, Louisiana Constitution of 1974: Taxation, 21 Loy. L. REV. 97, 102
(1975). See Bussie v. Long, 286 So. 2d 689, 702-03 (La. 1973).
23. 381 So. 2d at 449 (Dixon, J., dissenting).
24. Woodard v. Reily, 244 La. 337, 152 So. 2d 41 (1963); Stewart v. Stanley, 199
La. 146, 5 So. 2d 531 (1941); Upper Audubon Ass'n v. Audubon Park Comm'n, 329 So.
2d 206 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 333 So. 2d 240 (La. 1976).
25. 381 So. 2d at 449 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
26. Some commentators suggest that the sole fact that citizens and taxpayers
often have a substantial financial investment in the lawsuit, from which none of them
will gain specific monetary benefits, indicates an exceptional kind of interest, indi-
cative of a desire to zealously pursue one's contentions. See Jaffe, The Citizen as
Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian of Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PENN.
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Even if one were to find that the interest of the plaintiffs in
League of Women Voters was insufficient for purposes of justiciabi-
lity, the interest was nevertheless as strong as that asserted by
plaintiffs in previous decisions," particularly Bussie. Furthermore,
Louisiana need not be strictly bound by the traditional requirement of
adversity in light of the provisions of the 1974 Louisiana Constitu-
tion relative to .jurisdiction' and of the 1974 decision of the Loui-
siana Supreme Court in In re Gulf Oxygen.'
The Louisiana Constitution of 1921, in article VII, section 35,
required that "[t]he District Courts, except in the parish of Orleans,
shall have original jurisdiction in all civil matters regardless of the
amount in dispute, or the fund to be distributed ... and in all cases
where no specific amount is in contest . . . .", By contrast, the Lou-
L. REV. 1033, 1037-38 (1968); Kates & Barker, Mootness in Judicial Proceedings:
Toward a Coherent Theory, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1385, 1410 (1974). This is an interesting
theory, yet one which disregards totally the purpose justifying the requirement that
the parties be truly adverse.
Other writers profess that a public suit brought by citizens and taxpayers may be
useful in numerous ways. A citizens' suit can, for instance, provide a mechanism for
courts to settle disputes when differential interests are involved; such a suit
recognizes that all citizens have a stake in the enforcement of laws and can provide a
solution to problems when the political process is unresponsive. Furthermore, a public
suit can provide an opportunity for the vindication of interests in a neutral forum,
where an individual can have an existing law enforced, despite the fact that only a
minority of citizens are aware of the violation. Thus, a public interest furthers the
democratic process and makes government more responsive. Tucker, The Metamor-
phosis of the Standing to Sue Doctrine, 17 N.Y.L.F. 911, 949-50 (1972); Comment,
Standing, Separation of Powers, and the Demise of the Public Citizen, 24 AM. U.L.
REV. 835, 872 (1975).
27. See Bussie v. Long, 286 So. 2d 689 (La. 1973). See also Upper Audubon Ass'n
v. Audubon Park Comm'n, 329 So. 2d 206 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 333 So. 2d
240 (La. 1976). In Upper Audubon Ass'n the plaintiffs alleged that, because a lease
awarded to Novelty Enterprises was not granted through public bid, the lease might
not provide the highest rental. The court found this potential harm sufficient to allow
the plaintiffs standing to sue as taxpayers. 329 So. 2d at 207. In the recent decision of
Pierce v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 392 So. 2d 465 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1980), the first circuit stated:
The issue of whether a Louisiana taxpayer, as such, absent a special interest, has
standing to sue a governmental institution, seems unsettled. League of Women
Voters, supra, appears to conflict with and overrule the following: Stewart v.
Stanley, 199 La. 146, 5 So. 2d 531 (1941); Woodard v. Reily, 244 La. 337, 152 So.
2d 41 (1963); Upper Audubon Association v. Audubon Park Commission, 392 So.
2d 206 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied 333 So. 2d 240 (La. 1976).
Id, at 467 n.3.
28. LA. CONST. art. V, § 16.
29. 297 So. 2d 663 (La. 1974).
30. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 35 (1921) (emphasis added).
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isiana Constitution of 1974 vests district courts with original jurisdic-
tion of "all civil and criminal matters." 1 As one commentator wrote,
[T~he jurisdiction is not confined to cases involving state laws or
to disputes involving a certain monetary threshold. It is a broad
grant of jurisdiction over all matters, consistent with the com-
mittee purpose of allowing the legislature to convert the judicial
system to a three-tiered one in which no courts of original juris-
diction other than the district courts would exist. The reference
to matters, rather than cases, accommodates ex parte, non-
contradictory proceedings in the district courts which may not
technically be adversary cases. 2
Even before the 1974 Constitution took effect, the Louisiana
Supreme Court adopted a liberal view of standing in In re Gulf
Oxygen.3 Holding that the trust code provisions" allowing a trustee
to apply for ex parte proceedings were constitutional, the court
noted that it could "find [no] authority holding that [the] perfor-
mance of the judicial function necessarily involves an adversary pro-
ceeding.' 'M Nonetheless, this opinion does not abandon totally the
notion that some sort of adversity between the parties is required.
The functional equivalents of adversity were present in the case, as
Professor Maraist has noted:
Although the trustee is unopposed in the ex parte instruction
proceeding, he remains liable to the settlor and beneficiaries for
erroneous or negligent acts, including the manner of presenta-
tion of the case for ex parte order. In addition the ex parte
order will bar the trustee from seeking indemnification from the
third party with whom he has dealt. These unusual circum-
stances should assure that the trustee will be properly moti-
vated to present to the court all of the facts and law available to
him surrounding the order. Thus, the requirements of the adver-
sary system may be satisfied although the proceeding is ex
parte."
31. LA. CONST. art. V, § 16 provides: "Except as otherwise authorized by this con-
stitution, a district court shall have original jurisduction of all civil and criminal
matters .... " (emphasis added).
32. Hargrave, The Judiciary Article of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 37 LA.
L. REV. 765, 809-10 (1977) (emphasis added).
33. In re Gulf Oxygen, 297 So. 2d 663, 665 (La. 1974), was based upon provisions
of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921.
34. LA. R.S. 9:2233(B) (Supp. 1964).'
35. 297 So. 2d at 666.
36. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975
Term-Procedure, 36 LA. L. REV. 556, 558 (1976).
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In light of both the 1974 constitution and the more liberal view
of standing taken by the Lousiana Supreme Court in In re Gulf
Oxygen, it is submitted that the taxpayers in League of Women
Voters had a sufficient interest to assure "adversity," or at the very
least, as strong an interest as that exhibited by the plaintiffs in
Bussie and prior decisions. 7
This seeming inconsistency with prior jurisprudence could have
been avoided if the League of Women Voters court had chosen an
alternative and more appropriate basis for its decision: the political
question doctrine. While basing its opinion on the absence of stand-
ing, the court nonetheless noted that "[i]nterference by the judiciary
at the instance of the plaintiffs would surpass the authority allo-
cated to us in the tripartite system."' This seems to indicate that
the court was concerned that the matter involved a "political ques-
tion" better left to another branch of government or to the people. 9
The political question doctrine was expressed by the Louisiana
Supreme Court as early as 1847 in The First Municipality v. Pease.0
In that case it was claimed that a wharfage charge by the City of
New Orleans was unconstitutional. The court declined to consider
the question, stating that the charge was a matter of municipal
administration and not of judicial interpretation. 1 Generally, an
issue presented to the courts involves a political question when it
presents a matter which should be properly resolved by the execu-
tive4" or legislative'" branches of government.
The political question doctrine is reflected in article II, sections
one and two of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, which establishes
a separation of powers." Additionally, before the 1974 constitutional
revision, the 1921 constitution provided that "[n]o function shall ever
37. See note 27, supra.
38. 381 So. 2d at 448.
39. See text at note 6, supra.
40. 2 La. Ann. 538 (1847). The Louisiana Supreme Court stated:
The judicial action is put forth in favor of absolute, positive, legal rights; they
must be separated by a distinct line of demarcation from those which are subject
to the action of other branches of the government, the interference with which
must be avoided. Such is, as we understand it, the theory of our system; and upon
the observance of the principle of leaving to each branch of government the per-
formance of the functions with which it is invested, its success and durability
depends.
Id. at 542.
41. Id. at 544.
42. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Thompson, 5 Rob. 367 (La. 1843).
43. See, e.g., Staring v. Grace, 97 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957) (stressing
that only the legislature has the power to decide what laws are the most desirable and
equitable ones).
44. See text at note 6, supra.
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be attached to any court of record, or to the judges thereof, except
as are judicial . . . .", The 1974 counterpart of this article vests
judicial power in the state courts, but does not limit expressly the
role of courts and judges solely to the performance of judicial func-
tions.4 ' This omission may give Louisiana courts more flexibility and
discretion in deciding cases which, in the past, might have been re-
jected as involving political questions. Nonetheless, courts will con-
tinue to be limited implicitly to the performance of "judicial" func-
tions by separation of power restraints.
7
Jurisprudence regarding the political question doctrine is, how-
ever, no less inconsistent than jurisprudence involving taxpayer
standing. Louisiana courts have, on occasion, entered into decision-
making traditionally believed to fall into the spheres of influence
and authority of other branches of government. 8 This is best exem-
plified by Hainkel v. Henry,'9 wherein the main issues concerned the
effect of legislative committee actions during the portion of the
eighty-five calendar day session when neither house was in session."'
The court interpreted the constitutional provisions relating to legis-
lative action and held that the meeting and action of a legislative
committee on a day on which neither house is in session does not
constitute a "legislative day" and should not be included within the
sixty legislative days constitutionally allowed for regular annual
sessions." As Professor Hargrave noted,
[O]ne might wonder why the questions of legislative procedure
involved in Hainkel reached the court at all, especially via a
"friendly" declaratory judgment action instituted by two members
of the legislature against the leaders of both houses. One could
easily envision that such a question of legislative procedure
would have been considered a matter to be decided by the legis-
lature itself, based on its construction of the constitution. The
fact that the suit was filed, though, reflects a tendency in Loui-
siana to expect the courts to exercise broad powers of judicial
review and to decide questions many courts would not consider
as raising a case or controversy."
45. LA. CONST. art. VII. § 3 (1921) (emphasis added).
46. LA. CONST. art. V, § 1.
47. LA. CONST. art. II, §§ 1 & 2.
48. See, e.g., Hainkel v. Henry, 313 So. 2d 577 (La. 1975); Abbott v. Parker, 259
La. 279, 249 So. 2d 908 (1971). But see In re Michael Baer, 310 So. 2d 537 (La. 1975).
49. 313 So. 2d 577 (La. 1975).
50. Id. at 579.
51. Id. at 579-80.
52. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Loui-
siana Constitutional Law, 36 LA. L. REV. 533, 534-35 (1976). In State v. Gray, 221 La.
868, 874-75, 60 So. 2d 466, 468 (1952), the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:
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Despite the occasional willingness of Louisiana courts to hear
such matters, the political question doctrine nonetheless might have
provided the supreme court with a more appropriate means of dis-
tinguishing League of Women Voters from prior taxpayer standing
cases, particularly Bussie. Ordering the Tax Commission to equalize
tax assessments, while giving them two years to comply with the legis-
lative mandate," is not as politically volatile an action as compelling
the City Council of New Orleans, a board of elected officials, to vote
for an increase in taxes. From this perspective, the court was
justified in not hearing the matter, for in the background lurked the
problem of how the court would enforce its order should the City
Council refuse to vote for a tax increase.
Although these factors may have justified a refusal to entertain
the matter, the court could have avoided further confusion in the
already inconsistent line of jurisprudence regarding taxpayer stand-
ing had the court disposed of the case by utilizing the political ques-
tion doctrine.
Eve Barrie Masinter
THE DECLINE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL MANDATE:
Stryckers'Bay-A MODERN WEST SIDE STORY
In October 1971, the Trinity Episcopal School Corporation (Trin-
ity) sued in federal district court to enjoin the New York City Plan-
ning Commission (the Commission) and the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) from constructing low-income hous-
ing at a site on Manhattan's upper west side.' Trinity, which had
If the Senate failed to observe its own rules when it created the committee which
reported this bill, that fact cannot affect the validity of the act because it is well
settled that an act of the Legislature will not be declared void or invalid for
failure of the legislative body to observe its own rules of procedure. Such rules
are usually formulated or adopted by the legislative body itself, and the obser-
vance of these rules is a matter entirely within its control and discretion and is
not subject to review by the courts as long as the legislative action does not
violate some constitutional provision.
See Comment, Judicial Review of the Legislative Enactment Process: Louisiana's
"Journal Entry" Rule, 41 LA. L. REV. 1187 (1981).
53. 286 So. 2d at 706.
1. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
In 1969 the Commission, acting in conjunction with HUD, modified implementation of
an urban renewal plan on the upper west side of Manhattan after substantial progress
toward the plan's completion. Trinity, which had premised its investment in the pro-
1354 [Vol. 41
